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16 Chapter One
A graveyard of small aluminium boats
The growth of Saab shot skywards like its planes. The
seemingly inevitable Second World War came and, when
its end was finally in sight, the firm’s directors RAGNAR
WAHRGREN and SvEN OTTERBECK started to think about
alternatives. Who would need fighter planes once the war
was over? It appeared to be more lucrative to build light
and durable rowing boats out of aluminium rather than
planes. Seriously, in 1944 this idea was top of the list in
plans for the future of Saab — ahead of prefabricated
houses and built-in kitchen equipment.
But instead of ending, the war flared up again even
more violently and drove away all these ideas. Prefabri-
cated houses, kitchen equipment and light aluminium
boats went down the drain.
The decision not to build boats was not a difficult one for
the plane manufacturers. They built 250 of these little
aluminium craft with a pair of small aerofoils under the
bow and they sold a few in Africa but it was just not
possible to turn them into a profitable business. The
boats were good on the water but not on the market.
Saab concluded its excursion into the boat building indus-
try and scuttled the small aluminium boats. The traces of
this nautical escapade disappeared with a short gurgle.
They can still be viewed by experienced divers: the grave-
yard of the small aluminium boats is on the bottom of
Lake Vanern near Trollhattan.
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Qut of the air and onto the water: after the end of the Second World
War, Saal were looking to branch out ftom manufacturing aircraft and
thought that the future lay in small boats like this one, made of
aluminium and with short aerofoils under the bow. 250 of these little
aluminium craft were built, and here one of them is being demonstrated
by its constructor KuRT SjOGREN and his assistant. Bur things did not
eo as intended and Saab were to be more in their element on dry
land ,... (See page 16)
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94 Chapter Six
yesterday,” they would say and a fantastic horror story
would follow. The cold mist of horror would penetrate
the very bones of their listeners, and the blood in their
veins would turn to ice. The more dreadful the story, the
better. A discreet smile in the corner of his mouth would
indicate that the man telling the tale was well satisfied
with himself, his Saab and the world.
The “lunatic factor” came into play ten thousand
times per annum. And thar is why the Saab survived. .
These ten thousand “‘life-savers” were the enthusiasts
and the madmen who bought their first Saab and so
became an inseparable part of the Saab family. The Saab
was a part of their life, a part of their philosophy of life.
‘They had a feeling for the unusual technology, the uncom
mon front-wheel drive and the weird two-stroke engines.
‘They were the Saab crazies. Simply mad about the Saab.
Pride of ownership
Everybody who drove a Saab in the USA of the Sixties
was part of a kind of secret society. Saab drivers recog-
nized in each other a kindred spirit, a blood brother-
Saab drivers stuck together, united by their pride, and
shared their experiences. In 1964, LENNART LONNEGREN,
Saab's PR manager for the USA from 1963 to September
1989, drove his two-stroke Saab 96 to a club meeting in
Philadelphia. On the bridge spanning the River Delaware,
he met another Saab coming towards him on the opposite
side of the road, a rare occurrence in those days: at that
time, there were not many Saabs abour in the USA.
The sight of Lonnegren’s Saab 96 triggered a huge
chorus of hooting and wild gesticulations: “Stop, stop!
Lonnegren became quite scared. All this commotion made
him think that he had at least lost a wheel. Bur his fears
The “lunatic factor” 95
were soon put to rest: the hooting driver only wanted to
talk to him. It did not bother him at all that they were
ing the opposite lanes across Delaware Bridge during
the rush hour. They drove to the next parking area and
the other driver — let’s call him Mr. Parker — pointed out
‘to Lonnegren the long ladder he was transporting.
“Mr. Parker travelled around the country selling clad-
ding for houses. “Since I have been driving a Saab,” he
burbled enthusiastically, “I have saved myself a lot of
trouble with clients. Before it went like this: you need
‘eladding for your house. May I show you? Do you have a
adder? Could I use it? Not necessary any more. Now |
‘ean take my own ladder with me.” He indicated the huge
‘piece of equipment, which occupied the whole length of
his Saab 96. “That is not possible with any other car,
only a Saab.” With sparkling eyes he got back behind the
Wheel, leaving behind a speechless Lonnegren. But that is
thow they were, the crazy Saab drivers of the Sixties,
‘Definitely Saab-mad.
No status is the best status
4
Until 1966, American Saab customers remained a hamoge-
neous band of people, who were completely different
m everybody else. In this vast country, the USA, with
r strong car industry and a huge choice of all kinds of
international makes the purchase of a Saab was not only
a decision to buy a car, but also a decision to go against
fonyention. This “thing” from Sweden (“Where is
Sweden?") had front-wheel drive (“What? Front-wheel
rive? What's the good of thar?”) and, to crown it all, a
Wo-stroke engine (“What the devil is a two-stroke
engine?’’) Saab in America was “‘one against all the rest”.
A Saab was the very manifestation of determined noncon-
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Monogamy
During the introduction of the 99, 900 and 9000 in the
USA, Saab had the same problem as with all Saabs right
back to the Saab 96. Nobody believed the newest model
was a true Saab. Above all there were complaints from
the dealers. Just six months after the release of the 99,
pleading letters with the following request were arriving
at Saab’s US headquarters: “Please tell the Swedes to
send us the 96 again! Our customers want the 96 and not
the 99.” Saab drivers believed in faithfulness and mon-
ogamy. Their love of “their” car was strong, so strong
in fact, that even the attractions of a new beauty could
not persuade them otherwise. To this day the tradition
still exists, and will no doubt carry forth with future
Saabs to come.
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170 Chapter Ten
Scouts
Such endurance tests needed careful planning. In August
1985, an expedition to “spy out the land” with a camera
took place at the Alabama International Speedway. In
Sweden, Talladega was an almost unknown track and to
put an end to this handicap, they produced a video. PR-
director JIM FREEMAN drove several laps in his Camaro,
and STEVEN Rosst, Saab’s press officer in the USA, han-
dled the video camera — out of the sunroof at speeds in
excess of 100 mph.
The next problem was the biggest one: Saab wanted to
rent the track for a period of 25 days. Not one speedway
in the world can be made available for such a length of
time, and the same applied to Talladega. Harley-David-
son, the world’s most famous manufacturer of motor-
cycles, held a contract for carrying out tests there during
the period in question bur after intensive negotiations,
Harley-Davidson were kind enough to waive their test
rights for 25 days.
Such endurance tests do need a “dress rehearsal”. You
have to know if the tyres can stand the strain and how
much fuel is needed and you have to pay attention to all
the smal] but important things so as to avoid problems
later.
Between 29 September and 5 October 1985, a team of
eight carried out a trial in Talladega — with a black 9000
Turbo company car from Saab in Orange, Connecticut,
which was later used as the camera car for shooting the
“Long Run”, The black Saab had a nickname: Car
No. 4,
The results of the trial ran were very encouraging. Car
No. 4 covered 4,681 laps of 2.66 miles each, a total of
20,047 km. If you discounted the 108 pit stops, an average
speed of 212km/h was reached, if the pit stops were
The “Long Run” at Talladega 171
included the average speed was 203km/h. The car used
one full tank for each 47 laps. Hand pumps were used to
transfer petrol from 55 gallon drums into the tanks.
Consequently, the pit stops were extremely long and the
team knew before the Long Run that they would have to
reduce the time in the pits.
Don Naman, the Speedway manager, learned his first
Saab lesson during the trial run. An “average speed of
110 mph” had been mentioned during preliminary discus-
sions. Mr. Naman came along after the first 10 laps and
snapped at OLLE GRANLUND.
“You wanted to drive at 110mph, but you are doing
130mph now. You can’t do that with mass production
cars. That’s too dangerous.”
“We know what we are doing.”
“The tyres will not take the stress.”
“They will.”
“I give you five more laps, and they will be finished.”
Olle Granlund should have placed a bet with Don
Naman. The tyres took it and took it and took it.
“Donny” came back in the afternoon.
“When did you change the tyres?”
“We didn’t change the tyres.”
“When are you going to change the tyres?”
“Perhaps tonight.”
The next morning, the 9000 Turbo was still tearing
round the track using the same set of tyres. Don Naman
was more than impressed. He simply could not believe
it.
With the very promising results of the pre-tests under
their belt, Per GILLBRAND, director for engine develop-
ment, OLLE GRANLUND, director for the development of
new cars, Bosst HELLBERG, director for quality control,
and STEVEN Rossi travelled to Chicago where they met
Burpetre Martin on 2 May 1986. Martin was the
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“Doubting Thomases
None of the Southerners really believed that the “Long
Run” would turn out to be a long run. Nobody expected
all three Turbos to survive 20 days and nights. Audi had
tried before Saab in Talladega and gave up after 2 days
with engine problems. The people in Talladega had had
their experiences and based their contracts on them. The
NASCAR commissioners, fire department, security and
food supplies were all contracted for six days only. The
security team who knew what it was like from other
events and race tracks, laughed their heads off. “After
five days at the latest,” they said, “you will turn tail and
vanish.” The NASCAR commissioners were also very
sure. “Six days are enough. The Swedes will be gone by
then.” They were all fundamentally wrong. After six
days, a certain nervousness appeared when all the con-
tracts had to be prolonged.
The “doubting Thomases” changed their minds after
all contracts had been extended. They started to believe
in success and stood completely behind Saab, They under-
stood that Saab was a “winner”, not a “loser”. Winners
demanded respect and support. The “Thomases” were
very proud to be part of the “Long Run”, and to be part
of the records that Saab would achieve on “their” Speed-
way. Before, the Saab people were all foreigners and